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RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR INITIAL
ADMISSION TO THE BAR: A
COMPROMISE PROPOSAL
FOR CHANGE
The licensing of lawyers in the United States has long been the
exclusive power of the individual states.' They have jealously preserved
this authority, strongly resisting proposals for change.2 Instantaneous
communication, rapid transportation, and the increasing pervasiveness
of federal legislations have, however, broadened the scope of local legal
practice to the point where absolute state authority in bar admission
standards may no longer be justifiable. Bar admission procedures and
standards that reflect a prejudice against lawyers or recent law graduates
from other jurisdictions are antiquated in today's increasingly urban
and mobile society. Residence requirements4 for bar admission are a
I As early as 1872, the Supreme Court recognized
that there are privileges and immunities belonging to citizens of the United States
... and that it is these and these alone which a State is forbidden to abridge.
But the right to admission to practice in the courts of a State is not one of them.
This right in no sense depends on citizenship of the United States ....
. .. [T]he right to control and regulate the granting of license to practice
law in the courts of a State is one of those powers which are not transferred for
its protection to the Federal government, and its exercise is in no manner
governed or controlled by citizenship of the United States in the party seeking
such license.
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1872).
2 See, e.g., Cathey, The Fifth Amendment-Its Protection of the Right To Become
and To Remain a Lawyer, 21 ARx. L. R v. 361 (1967).
3 For example, legislation in the areas of civil rights, tax, and antitrust.
4 At present, most states have some form of residence requirement for new attorneys
as a prerequisite for admission to the bar, although Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, and Ohio
seem to have no such precondition. The status of the law is unclear in Georgia following
Webster v. Wofford, 321 F. Supp. 1259 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
Either residence or a bona fide intent to become a resident is prerequisite to admission
to the bar in these states: Alabama (ALA. STATE BD. OF COMM'Rs R. IV(A)); Arkansas (Ark.
Ed. of L. Examiners, Arkansas Bar Examinations-Requirements and Information) (un-
dated); Colorado (CoLo. Sup. CT. R. 204); Conn6cticut (CONN. SUPM. CT. R. § 8(2)); Idaho
(IDAHO Sup. Cr. (ADMISSION TO PRAcric) R. 102(5)); Iowa (IowA Sup. Or. R. 101); Kentucky
(Ky. Cr. App. (ADMISSION TO PRACrICE) R. 2.010(b)); Massachusetts (MAs. BD. OF BAR
ExAMINms R. V); Michigan (MicH. BD. OF L. EXAMINERS R. 1); Minnesota (MINN. Sup. Cr.
(ADMISSION TO BAR) R. II); New Hampshire (N.H. Sup. Or. R. 15); New Jersey (NJ. Sup.
Cr. R. 1:22-2); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-11-03 (Supp. 1969)); Oregon (ORM.
Sup. Cr. (ADMISSION OF ATrORNEYs) R. 1.10); Pennsylvania (PA. Sup. Cr. R. 13(A)); South
Dakota (S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 16-16-2 (1967)); Washington (WASH. SuP. Or. (ADMIS-
SION TO PRACTICE) R. 5(B)); Wisconsin (WIS. BD. OF STATE BAR COMm'RS R. 1.03(3)).
The remaining states require anywhere from 20 days to one year prior residence
before admission is allowed: Maryland (MD. Cr. APp. (ADMIssION To BAR) R. 5(a)) (residence
at time of application; application to be made 20 days prior to bar examination);
Nebraska (NEB. SuP. Cr. R. 11(2)) (residence at time of application; application to be made
831
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
prime illustration of such antiquated standards. Despite an increasingly
persistent call for reform,5 most state bar examination boards still im-
pose residence requirements that not only fail to reflect the expanding
scope of modem legal practice but are also unreasonable and perhaps
even unconstitutional. The hardships and inequities that result from
these state procedures are unnecessary and unjustifiable. Considerations
of reasonableness and progress necessarily militate toward a change in
present bar admission residence requirements.
I
THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS IN BAR ADMISSION
A state's power to establish whatever rules and regulations it
deems necessary for the licensing of professions is generally derived
from its broad police power to provide for the public health, safety,
and welfare.6 Thus, to protect its citizens from injuries that might re-
four weeks prior to bar examination); Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 08.08.130(3) (Supp. 1970))
(30 days); Oklahoma (OLA. Sur. CT. (ADMISSION TO PRACTICE) R. 1, § 2) (60 days); California
(CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE foil. § 6068 R. III§ 31(6) (West Supp. 1971)), North Carolina (N.C.
Sup. CT. (ADMISSION TO PRACTICE) R. VI § 1(6)), Tennessee (TENN. SUP. CT. R. 37, § 16)
(two months); Kansas (KAN. Sup. Cr. R. 210(d)) (90 days); Missouri (Mo. Sup. CT. (BAR Sc
JUDICIARY) R. 8.05), Rhode Island (R.I. BD. OF BAR ExAmiNEms R. 8), Texas (Trx. Sup. CT.
(BAR ADMISSION) R. II), Utah (UTAH Sup. CT. (ADMISSION TO BAR) R. III § 3-1(5) (three
months); Delaware (Dxn. Sup. CT. R. 31(2)(c)), Hawaii (HAWAI Sup. Cr. R. 15(c)), Indiana
(IND. STAT. ANN. § 29-3409 (1969), IND. Sup. CT. R. 3-13(A)(1)), Maine (ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 4, § 804 (Supp. 1970), Montana (MONT. Sup. CT. R. VI(A)(1)), Nevada (NEv. Sup. CT. R.
51(3)), New Mexico (N.M. Sup. CT. (ADMSSION TO BAR) R. II(A)(8)), New York (N.Y. CT.
App. (ADMISSION OF ATrORNEYs) R. II-(1)(d)), South Carolina (S.C. Sup. CT. (ADMISSION TO
PRACrICE) R. 5(3)), Vermont (VT. Sup. Cr. (ADMISSION OF ATroRNEYs) R. 1, § 1), Virginia
(VA. CODE ANN. § 54-60 (Supp. 1970)), Wyoming (Wyo. SuP. CT. R. 21(c)) (six months);
Mississippi (MISS. CoD ANN. § 8654 (1942)), West Virginia (W. VA. CODE § 30-2-1 (1966))
(one year); Arizona (A=uz. Sur. CT. R. 28(c)(IV)(2)) (three month residence prior to bar
examination or final year of law study in state law school).
5 See, e.g., Theagle, The Legal Establishment: Arbitrary, Unreasonable and Capricious
Standards, I Jusus DOCToR, Jan. 1971, at 8, 10:
"Residency requirements obviously serve no governmental interest at all, much
less a legitimate and compelling interest."
The xenophobic residency requirements which almost all states still impose on
bar applicants are an example of seemingly unlawful petty tyranny which
admissions authorities could have abolished before being required to do so by
the courts.
Cf. Comment, Admission to the Pennsylvania Bar: The Need for Sweeping Change, 118
U. PA. L. REv. 945 (1970).
6 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889):
The power of the State to provide for the general welfare of its people authorizes
it to prescribe all such regulations as, in its judgment, will secure or tend to
secure them against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity as well as of
deception and fraud. As one means to this end it has been the practice of different
[Vol. 56:831
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suit from improper practice of the law, a state generally establishes
minimum criteria to which a bar admission candidate must conform in
order to practice law within the state. Basically, these criteria attempt
to determine the candidate's knowledge, moral character, and resi-
dence.7
The criteria established to measure a bar admission candidate's
knowledge and legal competence are based, in part, on the state's
power to prevent the defrauding of its citizenry. State interest in a
lawyer's competence requires that, before a bar candidate is admitted
to practice, he be familiar with the nature, content, and peculiarities
of the state's law.8 Thus most states require that applicants seeking
admission to their bar pass a written substantive examination.9 Addi-
tional criteria designed to assure a candidate's basic knowledge of the
law may include minimum pre-legal and legal education require-
ments,10 or training under the supervision of a lawyer already admitted
States, from time immemorial, to exact in many pursuits a certain degree of skill
and learning upon which the community may confidently rely .... The nature
and extent of the qualifications required must depend primarily upon the
judgment of the State as to their necessity.
7 A typical requirement reflecting the use of these criteria is found in New Mexico:
An applicant for admission to the Bar, either upon examination or upon certifi-
cate and motion must be a citizen of the United States, an actual bona fide resident
of the State of New Mexico for at least six months prior to admission, 21 years of
age and of good moral character.
N.M. Sup. Cr. (ADMIssION TO PRAcricE) R. U(A)(8).
No person who is not a member of the bar of another American or common-law
jurisdiction shall be admitted to practice until he has successfully undergone a
written examination accomplished under terms and conditions equivalent to those
applicable to all other candidates for bar admission.
Id. R. IV(24).
8 Knowledge of the idiosyncrasies of both the procedural and substantive law of the
forum is not only essential to the quality of service a lawyer may render his client, but
it is also an indispensable element of the smooth and orderly administration of the local
judicial process.
9 In some instances the examination may be waived for graduates of the state law
school. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 256.28(1) (Supp. 1970).
10 States commonly require that a bar admission applicant complete two to four
years of undergraduate study and then complete three or more years of formal legal
training. Several states, however, provide for means of qualifying for admission to the
bar other than by formal completion of study in an undergraduate or legal educational
institution: California (CAL. Comt. OF BAR EXAIIINErs R. VIII § 81(2); id. R. IX § 91(4))
(undergraduate equivalency examination for applicants over 23 years old; office study of
law); Delaware (DEL. Sup. Or. R. 31(l)(e), (2)(d)) (undergraduate equivalency examination;
office study of law); Florida (FLA. Sup. CT. (ADMISSION To BAR) R. art. IV § 22(a))
(undergraduate equivalent); Georgia (GA. CoDE ANN. § 9-103(b)(i) (Supp. 1970)) (under-
graduate equivalency examination); Indiana (IND. SuP. CT. R. 3-13(B)(1)(a)) (undergraduate
equivalency examination); Massachusetts (MAss. Sup. JuD. Cr. R. 8:01(8)(a)) (undergraduate
equivalent); Mississippi (Miss. CODE ANN. § 8654 (1956)) (undergraduate equivalent; office
study of law); Montana (MONT. SuP. Cr. R. XXV(B)(2)(c)) (undergraduate equivalent);
New York (N.Y. Cr. App. (ADmmIoN OF ATTORNEYs) R. 111-3, V) (undergraduate equiva-
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to the bar." Although inequities may result from the means employed
to measure a bar applicant's knowledge,'2 it is generally unquestioned
that a state does have a justifiable interest in requiring that only com-
petent lawyers practice in its jurisdiction.'8
Similarly, while there is controversy about the manner in which
states attempt to measure a candidate's "good moral character,"' 4 the
courts have never denied that a state is entitled to demand high moral
and ethical standards of its legal profession. 5 As with the criterion of
lency examination; office study of law); North Carolina (N.C. Sup. CT. (ADMISSION TO PRAC-
TICE) R. IX § 2) (proof of completion of specified courses); Oregon (ORE. Sup. CT. (ADMISSION
OF ATrORNEYS) R. 4.10(l)(b)) (undergraduate equivalent); Pennsylvania (PA. SuP. CT. R.
l0(C)(1)) (undergraduate equivalent); Texas (TEX. Sup. CT. (BAR ADMISSION) K. V(1)(b)-(d))
(office study of law); Vermont (VT. Sup. Cr. (ADMISSION OF ATTORNEYS) R. 1, § 2) (office
study of law); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 54-62(2) (1967)) (office study of law); Washington
(WASH. SUP. CT. (ADMISSION TO PRACTICE) R. 2(D) (Supp. 1971)) (office study of law).
While the rules of some states do not specifically refer to pre-legal education require-
ments, such requirements may be incorporated by reference in the single rule that all bar
admission candidates who have not been admitted to the bar of another state must have
graduated from an ABA approved law school. E.g., Mo. Sup. CT. (BAR & JUDICIARY) R.
8.03(b). For a law school to be accredited by the ABA, it must comply with the following
standard:
It shall require as a condition of admission at least three years of acceptable
college work, except that a school which requires four years of full-time work or an
equivalent of part-time work for the first professional degree in law may admit a
student who has successfully completed two years of acceptable college work.
STANDARDS OF TiE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION FOR LEGAL EDUCATION 1, 10 (1969). Therefore
a student who graduates from an ABA-accredited law school will, by definition, have
completed a minimum of two years of undergraduate study.
11 For examples of such "office study" provisions, see CAL. Comm. OF BAR EXAMINERS
R. IX § 91(4); DEL. Sup. CT. R. 31(2)(d).
12 This problem is a serious one. Despite efforts to promulgate uniform standards
and practices (e.g., Report of the Committee on Admissions to the Bar, [1958] Ass'N AM. L.
SCHoOLs PRocEEDINGs 125, app. A), states continue to exercise their licensing authority in
an individual and haphazard manner. Fifty different standards of what constitutes a
"minimum level of competence" on the part of bar admission applicants remain a
potential source of inequity and discrimination among candidates of equal ability.
13 Note 6 supra; cf. Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425 (1926).
14 The methods and criteria used by a state to determine what constitutes a good
moral character have, of late, come under heavy attack in the courts. See, e.g., Spevack v.
Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Konigsberg v. State
Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Law
Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 299 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), prob. juris. noted, 396 U.S. 999 (1970); Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners,
65 Cal. 2d 447, 421 P.2d 76, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966).
5 The Supreme Court in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 853 U.S. 232 (1957),
held that a state dearly had a right to make character evaluations of bar admission
candidates as long as it did not do so "in a manner or for reasons that contravene the
Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 238-39
(footnote omitted). Specifically, the Court said,
A State can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character
or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualifica-
[Vol. 56:831
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knowledge, this requirement of good moral character seems to be justi-
fied by state interest in the welfare and protection of citizens. Since
lawyers are officers of the local courts, the character and integrity of
the bar is a natural matter of interest to the state.'8 Although the courts
may strike down unconstitutional means of assessing a candidate's moral
character, it is unlikely that such requirements will ever be declared
unconstitutional per se.
17
On the other hand, state interest in the third criterion for bar
admission, residence,' 8 is not so easily justified. Of the three criteria
tion must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to
practice law.
Id. at 239.
16 Another relevant consideration in this respect is that judges themselves are almost
invariably either selected or elected from the membership of the local bar.
17 See Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425, 428 (1926):
Every presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of the [licensing]
statute. . . .And the case is to be considered in the light of the principle that
the State is primarily the judge of regulations required in the interest of public
safety and welfare, and its police statutes may only be declared unconstitutional
where they are arbitrary or unreasonable attempts to exercise the authority
vested in it in the public interest.
18 Requirements of a specified period of residence may be divided into three
categories. The first is "pre-application," which requires residence for a specified period
before a bar admission candidate may even apply to be admitted to the bar. The following
states have "pre-application" requirements: Missouri (Mo. Sup. Cr. (BAR & JUDICIARY) R.
8.05) (three months); Delaware (DEL. Sup. CT. R. 31(2)(c)), Montana (MONT. Sup. CT. R. VI
(A)(1)), South Carolina (S.C. Sup. Cr. (ADMISsIoN To PRAcncE) R. 5(3)), Virginia (VA. CODE
ANN. § 54-60 (Supp. 1970)), Wyoming (Wyo. Sup. Cr. R. 21(c)) (six months); Mississippi
(MIss. CODE ANN. § 8654 (1942)), West Virginia (W. VA. CODE § 30-2-1 (1966)) (one year).
The second category is "pre-examination," which requires residence for a specified
period before a candidate may be allowed to take his written bar examination. These
states have such requirements: Maryland (MD. CT. App. (ADMISSION TO BAR) R. 5(a))
(residence at time of application; application to be made 20 days prior to bar examination);
Nebraska (NEB. Sup. Cr. R. 11(2)) (residence at time of application; application to be
made four weeks prior to bar examination); Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 08.08.130(3) (Supp.
1970)) (30 days); California (CAY.. Bus. & PROF. CODE foll. § 6068 R. III § 31(6) (West Supp.
1971)) (two months); Kansas (KAN. SUP. Or. R. 210(d)) (90 days); Texas (TEx. Sup. Cr. (BAR
ADMISSION) R. II), Utah (UTAH. Sup. CT. (ADMISSION TO BAR) R. III § 3-1(5)) (three months);
Hawaii (HAWAII Sup. Or. R. 15(c)), Maine (ME. RFv. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 804 (Supp. 1970)),
Nevada (NEv. Sup. Or. R. 51(3)) (six months); Arizona (ARIz. Sup. Or. R. 28(c)(IV)(2))
(three month residence prior to bar examination or final year of law study in state law
school).
The third category consists simply of those states having residence requirements which
do not fall into either of the previous classifications. These requirements may be called
"pre-admission" residence requirements, and the following states have them: North
Carolina (N.C. Sup. Or. (ADMISSION TO PRACTICE) R. VI § 1(6)), Tennessee (TrE NN. Sup. Cr.
R. 37, § 16) (two months); Oklahoma (OKLA. SuP. Cr. (ADMISSION TO PRAcrICE) R. 1, § 2)
(60 days); Rhode Island (R.I. BD. OF BAR EXAMINERS R. 8) (three months); Indiana (IND.
STAT. ANN. § 29-3409 (1969), IND. SUP. Or. R. 3-13(A)(I)), New Mexico (N.M. Sup. CT. (An.
MISSION TO BAR) R. II(A)(8)), New York (N.Y. Cr. App. (ADMISSION To PRACTICE) R. II-(1)(d)),
Vermont (VT. Sup. Cr. (ADMISSION OF ATrORNEYS) R. 1, § 1) (six months).
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generally used by a state to determine eligibility for admission to its
bar, residence is perhaps the most patently unreasonable and discrim-
inatory requirement, in terms of both theory and practical consequences.
By requiring a specific period of time for a student to wait before he
is allowed admission to a state bar,19 some states clearly inhibit a stu-
dent's choice of where to begin his practice.20 Determination of resi-
dence, in addition, often involves an element of chance, 21 since it
depends upon where the law student's residence is considered to be
by the state bar to which he has applied.
22
Furthermore, the practical effect of residence requirements as they
19 In some cases this would even include the right to take the written bar exam-
ination.
20 For instance, it is conceivable that a student whose parents live in New York
might attend an undergraduate university in Massachusetts and a law school in Connecti-
cut. Except for New York, this student upon graduation could not practice law immedi-
ately in any of the states that require a specific period of pre-application, pre-examination,
or pre-admission residence. In a state such as Nevada, he could effectively be precluded
from practicing for nearly 18 months. Nevada offers its bar examination once a year on
the third Monday of September (NEv. Sup. Cr. R. 65), and requires six months residence
prior to the examination, (id. R. 51 (3)). Thus a student coming to Nevada after March
would have to wait until September of the next year before he could even be considered
for admission to the bar.
21 It is often difficult for a law student to establish a residence in a state other than
that in which his parents reside, even by residing in another state while attending law
school:
We think, in fairness to a future applicant, he should be advised that if he
adopts Tompkins County [location of Cornell Law School] as a new residence,
we may want to inquire into facts to be satisfied that Tompkins County is, in
fact, an actual residence rather than a place where the applicant is living while
attending law school.
' * * Sometimes in the past we have been too lenient in accepting the
affidavits of law professors who do not know too much about the family
background of the applicant. We do not think that we do a person a favor in
letting him start his professional career by accepting his statement of residence
if it is purely pro forma.
Letter from the Comm. on Character and Fitness, Sixth Judicial District of New York, to
William Ray Forrester, Dean of the Cornell Law School, Aug. 10, 1970.
22 "[A] student who moves into residence on the campus of an educational institution
does not, without more, accomplish a change of voting residence .... "Robbins v.
Chamberlain, 297 N.Y. 108, 110, 75 N.E.2d 617 (1947).
The harsh effects of residence requirements are not necessarily confined to newly
graduated law students. Practicing attorneys who wish to move to another state may find
that they must suspend their practice while they wait the requisite period of time before
being admitted in their new state. Lawyers who wish to make special appearances in
particular cases may find that they are not allowed to do so because they are not members
of the local bar, and that they may not become a member of that bar without fulfilling
the requisite period of residence.
Most states provide for admission of practicing attorneys on the basis of comity or
special motion procedure-pro hac vice. A. KATz, ADMISSION OF NONREsmENT ATroPNEys
PRo HAc Vicz 1, 8 (1968). But frequently these methods are time consuming, unavailable,
or unsatisfactory in other ways.
[Vol. 56:831
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are applied by some states suggests that such requirements are used
for purposes less justifiable than the protection of local citizenry from
malpractice. Residence requirements may, in fact, be nothing more than
a means of limiting local competition.23. Such requirements may re-
flect a parochial prejudice against outsiders,24 and, in some cases, a
desire to thwart the effective enforcement of civil rights legislation.
25
If this is true, residence requirements may actually work against some
citizens rather than on their behalf. By keeping their membership low,
for instance, state bars may demand higher fees than would be justi-
fied if more practicing lawyers were available.
II
RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS AS UNREASONABLE IMPEDIMENTS TO INITIAL
BAR ADMISSION
Theoretically a state may justify its residence requirements on the
grounds that the time a candidate spends in the community before
he is admitted to the bar (1) allows him to become familiar with
local customs, practices, and idosyncrasies of the law, (2) permits his
peers to observe his behavior and determine his moral worthiness, (3)
gives him a deeper sense of community responsibility, and (4) affords
him an opportunity to give a strong indication of his sincere intent to
become a permanent resident of the community.2 Close examination
23 "The ostensible purpose is to promote high standards protective of the public, but
a cynic might wonder if the public shield does not conceal a sword against unwanted
competition." Howell, Does Judge Advocate Service Qualify for Admission on Motion?, 53
A.BA.J. 915 (1967).
24 [T]hose states which have made the entrance of foreign attorneys most difficult
have done so for one reason only: to discourage, as much as possible, the entrance
of foreign attorneys in order that legal business in their state go exclusively to
their own native attorneys. That these exclusionary rules were initiated and
promoted by the attorneys and bar associations of these several states seems
highly probable, inasmuch as they are the persons and organized groups most
interested in such restrictions.
Dalton & Williamson, State Barriers Against Migrant Lawyers, 25 U. KAw. Crry L. Rv.
144, 147-48 (1957).
25 Mann, Not for Lucre or Malice: The Southern Negro's Right to Out-of-State
Counsel, 64 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 143 (1969). According to this article, residence requirements
may be used to thwart the efforts of out-of-state lawyers who assist Negroes trying to
exercise various civil rights guaranteed them under recent federal legislation. Id. at 146-49.
This, coupled with the refusal of local bar members to represent Negroes (id. at 144-46),
constitutes a means of perpetuating barriers "against the Negro advance toward
equality" more subtle but no less serious than segregation. Id. at 143.
26 Some of these justifications, as well as portions of the textual analysis, may be
found variously in Horack, "Trade Barriers" to Bar Admissions, 28 J. Am. Jm. Soc'Y 102,
105-04 (1944); Mann, supra note 25, at 152-57; Note, Attorneys: Interstate and Federal
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of these justifications, however, indicates that they are actually only
extensions of the first two criteria of bar admission-written examina-
tions and character requirements.
The first justification merely supplements written examinations
in attempting to ensure that a lawyer is knowledgeable in local law.
Not only is a residence requirement repetitious in this respect, but it
would seem that there is little correlation between a student's knowl.
edge of local law and his mere residence in the community. The only
practical way a student can learn the refined aspects of his state's law
is to be exposed to it in his education or in his practice. Residence can
have no bearing on the quality of education he receives, 27 however, and
an applicant cannot practice law until after he has been admitted to
the bar. Thus, pre-admission residence requirements have little or no
reasonable connection to an applicant's knowledge of the peculiarities
of local law.
The second justification of residence requirements is nothing
more than a "good moral character" requirement. Community observa-
tion is simply another means to the end of licensing honest, trust-
worthy lawyers. This procedure, however, is a dubious and at best
inefficient way to investigate an individual's character. In today's in-
creasingly urban society, a community's observation of one of its
members is impractical if not completely impossible. Therefore, a state's
justification of residence requirements along these lines is unwarranted
in light of the reality of modem urban existence.28
The last two justifications for residence requirements suggest
that loyalty to the community is an important characteristic to be
determined in a bar admission applicant. A lawyer's loyalty to a com-
munity may prevent him from defrauding or victimizing that com-
munity by dishonest, unscrupulous behavior. The purpose of character
requirements, however, is to prevent just that. Community loyalty,
therefore, if nothing more than a means of ensuring a lawyer's good
Practice, 80 HARv. L. Rnv. 1711, 1714-16 (1967); Note, Restrictions on Admissions to the
Bar: By-Product of Federalism, 98 U. PA. L. Rv. 710, 717-18 (1950).
27 That is, the independent fact that a student resides in State A or State B would,
in and of itself, have little bearing on the amount or quality of information that he is
able to obtain about a particular state's local law. Other considerations such as the
location and calibre of the law school where he is trained are more important.
28 Residence requirements may remain of some value in smaller communities where,
in fact, local citizens might have an opportunity to evaluate effectively an applicant's
"moral character" prior to his admission to the bar. Residence requirements based on this
ground alone, however, manifest an unwarranted preference for rural communities. The
ineffectiveness, inconvenience, and impracticality created by the application of such
requirements in more populous cities would appear to outweigh any marginal benefits
that they might provide in less populated areas.
[VoI. 56:831
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moral character, is, like community observation, inefficient and un-
necessary. Furthermore, moral character cannot be measured within
the confines of a particular state or community. A lawyer's loyalty,
honesty, and integrity should extend to all people in any community,
not merely to any single community.
More pragmatically, it is conceivable that a state could claim a
legitimate interest in the residence of its lawyers on the grounds that
residence (1) facilitates attorney-client communication, (2) gives the
public confidence in the stability of the local bar, (3) expedites the con-
duct of trials and local judicial proceedings, 29 (4) aids in the apprehen-
sion of lawyers suspected of malpractice, or (5) eases the administration
of bar admission procedures such as registration, testing, investigation,
and interviewing. These interests may be generally classified as "con-
venience" justifications, and although it might be argued that progress
in transportation and communication makes even these justifications
unreasonable, it may be conceded that a state has some vested interests
in the smooth and convenient operation of its legal processes. Even
granting this point, however, there is still little justification for pre-
admission residence requirements of any great length. Except for
the few weeks that a bar candidate might be required to be present
in the state for registration, testing, investigation, and interviewing,
the need for residence requirements pertains to post-admission prob-
lems. Nonetheless, it is clear that any reform of present requirements
must recognize that there may still exist some valid state interests
justifying alternative, though more moderate, residence requirements.
III
RMIDENCE REQUIREMENTS AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENTS TO
INITIAL BAR ADMISSION
As obvious as many of the unreasonable aspects of residence re-
quirements may be, only recently has the judiciary considered the
constitutional problems raised by such regulations. In Keenan v. Board
of Law Examiners0 three practicing lawyers brought a class action in
federal court requesting a declaratory judgment to void as uncon-
29 See, e.g., Note, Restrictions on Admission to the Bar: By-Products of Federalism,
98 U. PA. L. Rv. 710, 718 (1950).
30 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970). Lengthy residence requirements are already
being challenged in other states. In Webster v. Wofford, 321 F. Supp. 1259 (N.D. Ga. 1970),
a Georgia federal district court held that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth




stitutional North Carolina's one-year residence requirement l and seek-
ing an injunction to prevent the Board of Law Examiners from
enforcing the requirement. 2 The special three-judge court unanimously
declared that the requirement as presently administered was uncon-
stitutional.
A. Denial of Equal Protection
The court in Keenan concluded that the Board of Law Examiners'
presumption that everyone who had resided in North Carolina for less
than a year was unfit to practice law in that state was a denial of equal
protection of the laws in contravention of the fourteenth amendment.
33
State legislation may create distinctions between different classes of
people, but such classification must reasonably relate to the purpose
of the legislation.3 4 Thus, while a state may reasonably create a distinc-
tion between those who are allowed to practice law within the state and
those who are not, the question remains as to whether a state may
reasonably base that distinction upon a determination of residence. 85
Addressing itself to this question, the court in Keenan held that such a
distinction was so unreasonable as to be an arbitrary and capricious
denial of equal protection to those candidates who might otherwise
be qualified to practice in the state.36 The court apparently recognized
that a residence requirement, standing alone, bears little or no relation
to a bar admission candidate's fitness. Thus, even though such a re-
quirement might, coincidentally, effectively eliminate some unfit and
incompetent candidates, 3 the North Carolina requirement was defi-
31 N.C. Sup. CT. (ADMISSION TO PRACTICE) R. VI § 1(6).
32 The suit was brought as a class action under FED. R. Crv. P. 23 on behalf of all
prospective applicants for the North Carolina Bar examination who had not resided in
the state for one year or longer. 317 F. Supp. at 1351 n.1.
33 317 F. Supp. at 1360.
34 [L]egislation may impose spedal burdens upon defined classes in order to
achieve permissible ends. But the Equal Protection Clause does require that, in
defining a class subject to legislation, the distinctions that are drawn have "some
relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made."
Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966), quoting Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111
(1966). This passage was quoted with approval by the Keenan court. 317 F. Supp. at 1358.
35 317 F. Supp. at 1358. The court in Webster v. Wofford, 321 F. Supp. 1259 (N.D. Ga.
1970), noted that Georgia's one-year residence requirement
creates two classes of prospective bar members. One class is comprised of those
bar applicants who have met all requirements for admission, including the one-
year residency requirement. The other class is comprised of those bar applicants
who have met all admission requirements except that of one year's residence. ...
The issue is whether the tone-year residence] requirement furthers some [legiti-
mate state interest, thus escaping] the conclusion that the requirement denies
equal protection. We find that it does not.
Id. at 1261.
36 317 F. Supp. at 1361.
37 Id. at 1360.
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cient because it could potentially injure those candidates who were both
fit and capable.38
B. Improper Restraint on Interstate Travel
Besides denying a bar admission candidate equal protection, resi-
dence requirements may also effectively inhibit a student or practicing
attorney from moving to a new state to establish his practice. Economic
considerations such as support of a family or repayment of accumulated
educational debts may make it imperative that a recent graduate
or lawyer be eligible to begin his practice as soon as possible. There
are certain administrative delays he must endure,89 but if they are
further complicated by length-of-residence requirements, 40 he may be
effectively prevented from moving to the new state. Thus, residence
requirements may unconstitutionally inhibit a citizen's right to unim-
paired interstate travel.
In considering this point, the Keenan court first noted that the
constitutionally protected "right" of interstate travel had been recently
reviewed by the Supreme Court in Shapiro v. Thompson.41 In that
case, the Court held that certain state and federal welfare regulations,4
which required welfare recipients to be residents of a state or the Dis-
trict of Columbia for one year before being entitled to receive welfare
payments, were unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection. 43 The
Court also held that since the Constitution guaranteed a right of
interstate travel, the statutory classification of indigent persons created
by the one-year waiting period44 was an unjustifiable impediment to
8 [The statute's] constitutional infirmity is "over inclusion." ... It burdens some
who, because of unfitness or incompetence, should not be licensed to practice; but
it also injures others who are both fit and capable. There are here no exigent
circumstances justifying such over inclusion.
Id. (footnote omitted).
89 The most common delays are having to wait for the specified date of the examina-
tion and then having to wait for the publication of the results of the examination and
character investigation. These delays themselves may effectively inhibit interstate travel.
For instance, Nevada only offers a bar admission examination once a year. Nay. Sup. Or.
R. 65.
40 Note 18 supra. "Pre-application" residence requirements are the most inhibitive
type of requirement and hence the clearest examples of unconstitutional bar admission
criteria. This is not to say, however, that either "pre-examination" or "pre-admission"
residence requirements are less inhibitive and, therefore, constitutional. The difficulties
and burdens that all such requirements place on interstate travel are sufficient to make
them equally unconstitutional.
41 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
42 CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-2d (Supp. 1965); D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-203 (1967); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 432(6) (1968).
43 394 U.S. at 627.
44 Similar to Keenan, the classifications created by the legislature in Shapiro were of
a class of citizens who were poor and who had lived in the state or District of Columbia
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interstate movements. The Court held that although no specific lan-
guage of the constitution guaranteed the right, it was nevertheless
well established.
45
The Keenan court followed the Shapiro rationale46 and ruled
that the North Carolina residence requirement "unconstitutionally
condition[ed] the exercise of the constitutional right to interstate
travel." 47 In the absence of any compelling state interest 48 to justify
classification of bar applicants into those who had resided in the state
for more than one year and those who had not, the court held that
those plaintiffs who had successfully passed their written examinations
and who were found to be of good moral character must be licensed
to practice law in North Carolina.49
IV
ALTERNATIVEs TO PRESENT RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS
A. Complete Abolition
In light of the unreasonable and, on the basis of Keenan, probably
unconstitutional burdens that lengthy residence requirements impose
on a lawyer's ability to practice law wherever he may choose, it is clear
for one year, and of another class of citizens, also poor, but who had not fulfilled the
one-year residence requirement.
45 This Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and
our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens
be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by
statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this move-
ment.
394 U.S. at 629-30.
46 The court in Keenan was aware of the Supreme Court's caveat in Shapiro:
We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence requirements
determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-free education, to obtain a
license to practice a profession, to hunt or fish, and so forth. Such requirements
may promote compelling state interests on the one hand, or, on the other, may
not be penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate
travel.
Id. at 638 n.21 (emphasis in original). Despite the explicit narrowness of Shapiro, however,
the Keenan court clearly felt that the reasoning was equally applicable to residence
requirements for admission to the bar. 317 F. Supp. at 1361.
47 317 F. Supp. at 1361.
48 Id. at 1362. The court's reference to state interests included the "theoretical
justification" for residence requirements. Text accompanying note 26 supra. As for
"convenience justifications," outlined in the text accompanying note 29 supra, the court
seemed to imply that even these state interests could not justify arbitrary residence
requirements: "Administrative inconvenience is, however, insufficient justification for an
arbitrary, over inclusive regulatory classification." 317 F. Supp. at 1360.
49 Id. at 1362. Following Keenan, North Carolina revised its residence requirement
from one year to two months. N.C. Sup. Cr. (ADMmsION TO PaAcrzca) R. VI § 1(6).
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that a change in existing requirements is imperative. The first alterna-
tive is the complete elimination of all residence requirements for
admission to the bar. This is the alternative suggested by the Keenan
case, 0 and it would undoubtedly be the simplest solution to the prob-
lem. Without stringent residence requirements, a lawyer could easily
become a member of several different bars, provided that he was com-
petent and morally fit.
As simple a solution as this would be, however, it is not the most
practical one. Since residence requirements may be an important
means used by state bars to protect vested interests and eliminate out-
side competition,51 it is clear that any proposal for change may have
to overcome substantial local resistance.52 Considering the fact that
there are arguably some justifiable state interests5 3 in requiring at least
post-admission residence, the best solution may be one that takes into
account both an applicant's interest in immediate eligibility for ad-
mission to a state bar and a state's interest in the residence of its lawyers
after admission.
B. Declaration of Intent
One approach to reconciling state interests with those of the in-
dividual would be the adoption of a system whereby a candidate seeking
initial admission to a state bar would merely declare, prior to being
admitted to practice, his bona fide intention to become a resident of
that state.54 Depending on the number of times the bar examination
is offered, a law student might be able to begin his practice with a
minimum amount of delay. The same would also be true of the lawyer
moving to the state to start a new practice. This procedure would not
eliminate the inevitable delays in waiting for the results of the examina-
50 The court seemed to believe that state interests in such residence requirements
as pre-admission registration, testing, investigating, and interviewing could just as easily
be served by different means. The court said:
The plaintiffs concede, and we agree, that some reasonable period of time may
be necessary to delve into the character qualifications of bar candidates; how-
ever, such time can be provided by a deadline for the applications of all applicants
set sufficiently before the examination. If the Board be concerned that out of
state applicants may not be readily available for interviews or may not fully
cooperate in the determination of their fitness, reasonable cooperation can be
assured by requiring it for admission.
817 F. Supp. at 1361.
51 Notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
52 Note 24 supra. For a not entirely objective discussion of recent Supreme Court
decisions in the traditionally autonomous area of state regulation of the legal profession,
see Cathey, supra note 2.
53 Text accompanying note 29 supra.
54 Several states permit bar admission on this basis. E.g. Mxcii BD. oF L. ExAinaa R.
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tion and character investigation, 55 but at least such delays would not
be further compounded by residence requirements. Thus, theoretically,
a "bona fide intent" requirement would allow a state to maintain its
legitimate interest in the post-admission residence of its lawyers while
avoiding unreasonable and perhaps unconstitutional discrimination
among its bar admission candidates.
From a practical point of view, however, it is unlikely that a state
favoring strong residence requirements would accept such an alter-
native. Declaration of a "bona fide intent" to become a resident in the
absence of proof or enforcement techniques could become a mere
formality. Hence, from the state's perspective, there would be very
little practical difference between this alternative and the complete
abolition of residence requirements.
C. Conditional Licensing
The third and most viable approach to residence requirements
represents a compromise between applicant interest in eliminating
such requirements and state interest in maintaining the status quo.
This approach would authorize the continued use of residence re-
quirements by states believing that the public welfare and the smooth
and efficient operation of their legal processes justifies the imposition
of such requirements.56 An important element of this approach, how-
ever, would be that only post-admission residence requirements could
be imposed.57 This would be accomplished by regulations under which
a candidate could apply for admission to the bar regardless of his
original or present residence on the condition that he could not be
fully certified until he had resided in the state for a specified period
of time. The permanence of the license that was first granted to him
would thus be contingent upon his continued residence in the state.58
55 For instance, even though a New York bar admission examination was given July
30-31, 1970, the results of the examination could not be announced until December 1,
1970. This delay was apparently due to the large amount of time required to grade the
1,985 examinations that were taken during the two-day period. N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1970,
at 42, col. 1.
56 This proposal is designed to modify the procedures of those states that presently
have very harsh residence requirements. It is not suggested that all states, least of all
those with few or no residence requirements, adopt this proposal. Perhaps with time, all
residence requirements will disappear, making such a "compromise" proposal unnecessary.
57 Problems of bar admission procedures could be handled in the manner suggested
by the Keenan court. Note 50 supra. Presence would naturally be required for bar
admission testing and interviewing, but actual residence would not be important until
after the candidate had been admitted to the bar.
58 How long this probationary period would last could be optional with each state.
Conceivably, a license could be issued which would be revocable whenever the lawyer
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If the candidate were to change his residence before the- license became
permanent, he would be required to go through the entire pre-admis-
sion testing and interviewing procedure before he could be readmitted,
even conditionally, to the bar of that state.
The conditional licensing of attorneys would not present insur-
mountable obstacles to newly graduated law students or to practicing
lawyers who wish to move to the state. At the same time, state interest
in the local residence of attorneys, for effective and convenient admin-
istration of the law, would also be secured.
Precedent for this method may be found in the present licensing
procedure followed in New Jersey. There, two types of licenses to
practice law are issued. One is a plenary license granted to those who
have passed the required admission examination and who have also
completed a skills and methods course (or, if authorized, a nine-month
legal clerkship). The other is a certificate of limited admission to those
who have passed the required examination but who have not com-
pleted the skills and methods course (or the clerkship). 59 New Jersey
limits the scope of this latter group's practice, 60 although ideally such
limitation would be unnecessary in a dual licensing system based solely
on residence. The New Jersey classification system thus provides prec-
edent for issuing more than one type of license to practice law.61
Thus there are several feasible alternatives to existing state res-
idence requirements. Considerations of the "perfect" solution, however,
discontinued his residence, no matter how long he had previously practiced in the state.
A more reasonable suggestion would be to make the post-admission residence period the
same as it now is for pre-admission. In that case, no probationary period would last longer
than one year.
59 NJ. Sup. Or. R. 1:27-1(b) provides, in part:
An applicant who has successfully ... completed an approved skills and methods
course or . . . has satisfactorily completed a legal clerkship, shall be issued a
certificate of plenary admission; and an applicant who has only passed the bar
examination shall be issued a certificate of limited admission. .. . An applicant
holding a certificate of limited admission shall be entitled to a certificate of
plenary admission upon the successful completion of an approved skills and
methods course or, if authorized, a legal clerkship.
See also id. R. 1:26 (skills and methods course; clerkship).
60 A New Jersey bar admissions candidate employed by an attorney or a law firm
may, after receiving his certificate of limited admission, practice law in the name of
that attorney or law firm. Moreover, he is entitled to share fees with the attorney or law
firm employing him. The holder of a limited certificate of admission may not, however,
have his own clients or appear as attorney of record in any cause. Id. R. 1:21-3(b).
61 Further precedent may also be found in the Oregon conditional licensing system,
which applies only to aliens. An alien is admitted to the bar with full membership privi-
leges, even though he may not yet be naturalized, providing he declares it his intention to
become a United States citizen and providing he is a resident of Oregon. If, however, he
fails to become a United States citizen within six months after the time he is eligible, his
admission to the Oregon bar becomes void. OR. REv. STAT. § 9.280 (1969).
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must be balanced against the more pragmatic consideration of finding
the solution with the best chance of being adopted. The conditional
licensing approach, therefore, although perhaps not the ideal solution,
appears at present to be the best alternative for eliminating many of
the inequities that now result from state residence requirements.
James A. DeMent, Jr.
